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Abstract 
In spite of millennia of introspection, research and debate, there is still no compelling evidence for any 
single model of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux 2011). Nor is there agreement on how to define 
consciousness, what constitutes a rigorous model of consciousness, and what research methods are most 
appropriate or productive when investigating consciousness. Current science relies on biological models 
of brain function as metaphors for describing what consciousness does and cannot confirm postulated 
causal relationships between discrete functional brain states and specific characteristics or subjective 
“states” of consciousness. The absence of a strong conceptual framework for thinking about 
consciousness, together with intrinsic limitations of contemporary research methods and technologies, 
have resulted in numerous un-testable hypotheses concerning the general nature of consciousness and a 
paralyzing lack of consensus on research priorities and methods ,  despite the fact that “mind” and “brain” 
have supplanted genetics as the next great scientific challenge for the international community -see the 
Human Brain Project in the EU and the BRAIN Initiative in the US (http://www.nih.gov/science/brain). 
With the above circumstances in view the principal goal of this paper is to clearly describe and concisely 
review philosophical problems and questions that are important to consider when developing models and 
research methods pertaining to consciousness. Topics covered include the roles and limitations of 
paradigms in science and other epistemologies, the relevance of different levels of analysis for 
investigating natural phenomena including the special case of consciousness, and different understandings 
of causality. The integral relationship between the nature of consciousness and the ‘background’ structure 
of space-time is discussed. A concise review of strengths and limitations of popular models of 
consciousness shows that current scientific models are based on naïve materialist assumptions that cannot 
potentially explain all functional characteristics or states of consciousness. The concepts of ‘body-brain’ 
and ‘embodiment’ are explored with respect to consciousness. I argue that a complete systems model of 
consciousness cannot be attained in the context of current science using existing research methods and 
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technologies - however limited models of consciousness are possible. The evidence for so-called ‘non-
ordinary’ characteristics or subjective states of consciousness including claims of psychic functioning is 
briefly reviewed and conceptual problems pertaining to deriving models of Psi are discussed. The paper 
concludes with questions aimed at reconciling contemporary models of consciousness with models that 
purport to explain so-called 'non-ordinary' states of consciousness, including claims of psychic 
functioning. 
 
 
Approaching consciousness—first philosophical steps 
Any rigorous discussion of consciousness must entail philosophical analysis to ensure that premises and 
arguments are both explicit and stated in clear language. When premises or arguments are not explicit or 
are phrased in vague jargon there is little hope for philosophically and scientifically rigorous dialogue  
slowing progress toward an adequate theory of consciousness. In order to derive an adequate and coherent 
model of consciousness capable of explaining ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ 
objective characteristics and subjective states (i.e, qualia), premises and arguments must be consistent and 
transparent throughout the work.   
There is disagreement on a single ‘best’ consensus definition of ‘consciousness’;  thus disparate models 
of consciousness start from different premises, employ arguments with different logical forms, and have 
different conceptual and research goals. Depending on starting premises, disparate models lead to very 
different inferences with respect to satisfactorily “defining” consciousness. For example, the premise that 
consciousness is a specialized property of life and is possible only in relationship to certain kinds of 
complex living systems leads to very different kinds of models than the premise that consciousness exists 
in its own right as a ‘primary’ kind of phenomenon in the universe. It follows that attempts to define 
consciousness cannot be other than competing descriptions of premises about the kind of thing 
consciousness is or can be, what it is like to have such-and-such an experience, or what consciousness 
does, and how consciousness is related (or not) to life, matter and energy. Attempts to “define” 
consciousness are thus equivalent to statements about beliefs that certain premises are more valid than 
others—and not statements of fact. Proposed definitions of consciousness are often framed as descriptions 
of subjective states related to ‘what it is like’ to have ‘such and such’ an experience. Few definitions 
make claims about discrete mechanisms of action or attempt to distinguish between subjective 
experiences that are susceptible to empirical investigation and those that are not. In other words, the 
majority of ‘definitions’ of consciousness rely principally on conjecture about unsubstantiated 
mechanisms and constitute a priori metaphysical assumptions because they are not falsifiable using 
available empirical means. The problem of “defining” consciousness is related to the more general 
problem of establishing a typology of different models of consciousness with a view toward clearly 
stating the underlying premises of disparate perspectives and remarking on their respective strengths and 
limitations. In view of the above it is unlikely that a single consensus definition or ‘shared understanding’ 
of consciousness will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future (Gierer 2008).  In spite of seemingly 
intractable philosophical problems encountered when attempting to define consciousness in general, it 
may be productive to explicitly state the premises underlying models that purport to describe or explain 
particular observable characteristics or subjective states of consciousness. I believe that investigating 
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particular or ‘limited’ characteristics or subjective states associated with consciousness in an open-minded 
multidisciplinary framework will invite systematic discussion and debate on various models and suggest 
important future research questions.  
 
Different ways of knowing—general considerations and implications for future science  
Science and alternative ‘ways of knowing’ rest on divergent assumptions about the nature of phenomenal 
reality. These differences reflect the incommensurability of paradigms embedded in contemporary science 
and alternative world views described by Kuhn in his seminal work Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Kuhn 1970). Science currently regards mainstream theories in physics, chemistry and biology as 
providing an adequate explanatory framework for consciousness, including ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and 
so-called ‘non-ordinary’ experiences such as claims of psychic functioning. However, contemporary 
science is only one of many theoretical domains in which consciousness may be rigorously investigated, 
yielding valuable insights. Other ways of knowing (i.e., epistemologies) that offer valid schemata for 
conceptualizing relationships between body-brain-environment and consciousness include quantum 
physics, complexity theory and emerging concepts in the life sciences, medicine and spirituality.  
Many ways of knowing do not endorse or rely on contemporary scientific models of space-time, matter, 
causality, energy and information, and claim that alternative epistemological lenses may yield more 
accurate and more complete understandings of consciousness than available in contemporary scientific 
discourse. For example, introspective analysis of the “quality” or “meaning” of unique highly subjective 
experiences may yield insights about the phenomenological nature of conscious experiences that are as 
valid as findings from advanced functional brain imaging research. Furthermore, alternative ways of 
knowing may examine conscious states or experiences resulting from dynamically interacting factors in 
the complex body-brain-environment system which may not be reducible to current scientific theories and 
the language of linear causality. Complexity theory and other emerging theories in physics and the life 
sciences that examine phenomena from the perspective of non-linear dynamics may ultimately provide 
more accurate and more complete explanatory models of life in general including the special case of 
living systems that exhibit the capacity for consciousness (Seth et al 2006; Bullmore & Sporns 2009). 
Diverging perspectives of contemporary science and alternative epistemologies suggest the need for 
conceptual bridges between disparate paradigms. A dialog based on such trans-paradigm ‘bridges’ may 
help resolve misunderstandings related to the ambiguities of language while also clarifying the nature of 
conceptual gaps between disparate ways of knowing about consciousness. 
 
Evolving paradigms and implications for consciousness research 
A paradigm is a conceptual framework or “way of knowing” that biases and filters how phenomena are 
observed and interpreted. Materialism is presently the dominant philosophical perspective of Western 
civilization and the received dogma embedded in the theories and methods of current science. 
Materialism is thus the (often implicit) perspective that underlies the conceptual framework of physics, 
biology, neuroscience and, by extension, consciousness research. All paradigms are in a continuous state 
of flux because emerging research findings and novel models transform ways of knowing about the world 
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on an on-going basis. In reciprocal fashion, the evolution of paradigms invites novel ideas about the 
nature of phenomena. Hundreds of years of conceptual evolution of the orthodox materialist paradigm 
have led to numerous models of consciousness whose propositions are congruent with the tenets of 
materialism including for example, different versions of functionalism (Van Gulick 2011). Recent 
decades have seen serious challenges to the conventional materialist paradigm by advances in the basic 
sciences including quantum mechanics, high energy physics, complexity theory and other domains. A 
new paradigm contributes to the explanatory power of science when it provides a more complete and 
more accurate picture of causes of phenomena or descriptions of relationships between phenomena. The 
evolution of paradigms will gradually transform contemporary science resulting in novel explanatory 
models of reality in general that will in turn lead to radical new models of life and consciousness. 
Accordingly, the findings of any particular research methodology used to examine objective 
‘characteristics’ or subjective ‘qualia’ of consciousness do not explain consciousness so much as they 
reflect the limitations of the paradigm in which a question is asked. Emerging models not yet endorsed by 
science may provide important future research directions for examining the nature of consciousness per 
se, and help clarify complex relationships between particular characteristics or subjective experiences 
associated with consciousness and the dynamic system of body-brain-environment.  
Every model is adduced within the context of a particular paradigm and from the unique perspective of its 
author. Humans are embedded in a rich social, cultural and intellectual tapestry that shapes the way they 
perceive, reason and act. Therefore all models, including models pertaining to the nature of 
consciousness, are by definition biased and limited in that they necessarily reflect the specialized and 
limited knowledge, perspectives and beliefs embedded in the cultural-ideological milieu of the author. 
The rigor and relevance of a particular model reflect the capacity of its author to objectify or ‘step outside 
of’ the lived social, cultural and intellectual context in which the creative work is done together with his 
or her skill at accurately identifying biases and constraints imposed by the milieu. This is equivalent to 
stating that the quality of any model reflects the capacity of its author to be cognizant of his or her social 
and ideological milieu and the limitations of method in a way that is self-reflective, self-critical and 
value-neutral.  
The ‘way of knowing’ within which a particular phenomenon is approached prefigures the premises, 
model and method used to examine it, resulting in an inevitable self-reinforcing circularity between 
epistemology, method and findings. Making explicit both the epistemology and premises on which a 
particular paradigm is based will clarify assumptions about the nature of phenomena being investigated 
and suggest useful methods of investigation. A myriad ‘ways of knowing about’ are used to investigate a 
wide range of natural phenomena. Disparate ways of knowing employ various methodologies to 
investigate phenomena - however all methodologies can be reduced to two general conceptual 
approaches: empirical methodologies that provide objective information about properties of phenomena 
including, principally, scientific method; and non-empirical methodologies that use subjective approaches 
to characterize the nature of experiences related to phenomena including intuitive ‘knowing,’ and a range 
of other non-rational approaches including spiritual and transpersonal approaches. While claims of 
‘intuitive’ or ‘non-rational’ knowing do not rely on empirical verification of phenomena, such claims may 
be regarded as ‘stronger’ when supported by ‘objective’ findings.  
Scientific method is currently the dominant empirical methodology, however intuition is a widely used 
non-empirical methodology for ‘knowing about’ phenomena in disparate cultural contexts and spiritual 
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traditions. Asking questions about kinds of phenomena that can have existence (ontology) or about 
disparate ways of knowing about phenomena (epistemology) entails comparing advantages and limitations 
of disparate epistemological and ontological assumptions with respect to shared beliefs about their 
relative utility in adducing explanatory models. Thus it is important when investigating phenomena from 
the perspective of any particular paradigm (e.g., science, linguistics, A.I., theoretical physics, theology, 
philosophy, mysticism, etc) to clearly articulate the paradigm and methods used to investigate phenomena 
and adduce explanatory models. Widely endorsed scientific models are generally based on expert 
consensus on their merits with respect to their ability to adequately explain phenomena being 
investigated. The endpoint of any investigation is pre-figured and limited by the paradigm in which the 
question being asked is conceptualized because the paradigm determines the kind and quality of 
information that can potentially be obtained through inquiry. The models and methods that comprise 
contemporary science play a dominant role in financially more developed countries because the enormous 
social and economic benefits accrued from research ensure continuation of entrenched ideological and 
financial interests that directly benefit from scientific advances in developed world regions. In this way 
the dominance of scientific materialism  as a paradigm and set of methods and the hegemony of world 
centers of geopolitical and financial power reciprocally reinforce one another on an on-going basis.  
General models of reality rest on core premises about phenomena: 
 that exist in ways described in the model 
 that do not exist but for which existence is metaphysically possible 
 that are related to particular phenomena being examined (including the special case of 
consciousness) 
As already noted, the paradigm within which a theorist or researcher thinks and writes biases and 
constrains his or her perspective, choice of research problems and methods used to investigate 
phenomena, and thus pre-figures legitimate interpretations of findings pertaining to causes or meanings of 
phenomena regarded as possible or plausible. Along these lines, it is widely accepted as dogma in current 
science that legitimate explanations of observable characteristics or functions of consciousness or reports 
of subjective experiences are those which follow from and are consistent with core premises of a general 
model of consciousness widely acknowledged as valid by an academic community of ‘expert’ 
researchers. Keeping in mind that agreement on valid interpretations of objective characteristics or 
subjective experiences associated with consciousness may vary widely between disparate paradigms, it 
follows that the particular paradigm within which a researcher investigates or thinks about consciousness 
influences what he or she may ultimately ‘discover’ through research and by extension, biases 
interpretations of the significance of findings. Along the same lines,  the method selected for interpreting 
the significance of findings pertaining to a particular characteristic or function associated with 
consciousness or assigning ‘meaning’ to reports of subjective conscious experiences informs and biases 
understandings of phenomena related to consciousness regarded as valid interpretations.  Following the 
argument, the capacity of any model to adequately characterize phenomena associated with a particular 
observable characteristic or subjective ‘quale’ of consciousness are related to the explanatory power of  
the research methodology derived within the context of that model which in turn (above) reflects core 
premises of the paradigm in which the model is embedded. In sum the particular paradigm that pre-
figures the way a researcher “sees” and interprets phenomena related to consciousness significantly 
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influences and constrains ‘findings’ that may be obtained using a particular research method and 
determines shared beliefs about valid ways to interpret the quality or relevance of findings and thus to 
assign significance to findings. Finally, different models of consciousness often rest on disparate (often 
implicit) models of causality which reflect divergent assumptions about the nature of causality in 
paradigms from which they are derived. A general model of consciousness and the paradigm within 
which a particular observable characteristic or subjective ‘quale’ of consciousness is understood or 
approached through experimental research are thus logically related and reciprocally reinforcing concepts.  
 
Three levels of philosophical analysis 
Regardless of particular kinds of phenomena being investigated, philosophical analysis takes place at 3 
‘levels’ with respect to verification of existence in general, verification of kinds of relationships between 
entities or processes that exist or potentially exist, and examination of the roles of fundamental entities or 
processes (i.e., whose existence has previously been established) in the particular phenomena being 
investigated in the context of a specified paradigm and a particular model. The first ‘level’ of analysis 
entails establishing a method for determining categories of phenomena that exist or potentially exist. 
Determinations of existence cannot be achieved using scientific method or other objective methods 
because premises about fundamental existence are by definition metaphysical propositions that cannot be 
verified but which reflect widely shared beliefs about the nature of existence and kinds of phenomena that 
can exist. Existence of any particular entity or process on its own side (ie, without reference to other 
phenomena or an ‘outside’ system) is not objectively verifiable however (some) properties of phenomena 
can be described in terms of human perception. The second ‘level’ involves analysis of fundamental or 
‘ground’ phenomena including for example, space-time, matter and energy, in which particular 
phenomena under investigation are situated. This level of analysis often begins with examination of a 
general ‘theory of reality’ that may not be explicit in a model being investigated but which provides the 
‘ground’ in which the phenomena under investigation are situated. The claim that certain general or 
‘ground’ phenomena exist and make up the ‘world’ in which phenomena being investigated exist or for 
which existence is metaphysically possible, precedes and pre-figures claims of existence of particular 
phenomena that can be characterized only in relationship to the ‘ground’ or the ‘world’ in which they 
have existence. Most claims of existence of particular phenomena reflect widely shared beliefs about the 
truth of metaphysical propositions describing kinds of phenomena that exist or can exist. Such claims are 
highly problematic because the issue of non-verifiability remains as in the first level of analysis. The third 
‘level’ of analysis of phenomena is different from the first two in that objective empirical tests—at least 
in some instances—can be used to determine properties of entities or processes that constitute necessary 
or sufficient conditions for the existence of particular phenomena including, for example, objective 
characteristics and subjective qualia associated with consciousness. Some claims about phenomena 
examined at the ‘third level’ of analysis are verifiable as either ‘true’ or ‘false.’ However, even in cases 
when findings support claims made in a hypothesis, confirmation of existence or of the nature of 
particular phenomena remains elusive because all claims about phenomena ultimately rest on non-
verifiable metaphysical propositions.  
It follows from the above argument that even in cases where existence of phenomena can be empirically 
verified, the ontological status of phenomena ultimately rests on antecedent metaphysical propositions 
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that are, by definition, non-verifiable. Such non-verifiable metaphysical propositions about the nature of 
phenomenal reality on which all scientific theories are based are “pre-scientific’ assumptions in that they 
are by definition antecedent to the work of science (Boss 1994). In view of the intrinsic limitations of 
analysis with respect to verifying claims of existence it is germane to ask whether alternative ‘ways of 
knowing’ can be applied to analysis of phenomena yielding more complete or more adequate models 
complementing the explanatory power of science. Further, might such alternative epistemologies yield 
models that are more ‘elegant’ or more ‘useful’ compared to contemporary scientific models?   
 
Models of natural phenomena—philosophical starting points 
At the outset it is important to explicitly state premises that pre-figure, constrain or bias concepts used to 
build a model. As already noted, ‘pre-scientific’ premises are metaphysical propositions in that they do 
not rest on antecedent premises, and thus  can neither be independently verified as true nor refuted as 
false. ‘Pre-scientific’ premises constitute the unstated core of all scientific thought and therefore, all 
scientific models. With the above in mind a prudent approach to building a model pertaining to natural 
phenomena in general may entail delineating core premises describing the dynamic attributes of the 
system at the broadest level possible, and assembling a coherent model on the basis of these core 
premises. My starting premise is that space-time is a priori necessary for existence of all ‘things” and 
“processes,” by extension all natural phenomena ‘exist’ (ie, ‘are situated’) in a background of space-time. 
By convention, ‘things’ are discrete entities or complex aggregates of discrete entities situated in space-
time, while processes are dynamic relationships between discrete things situated in space-time. My 
second premise is that the ‘thingness’ of any entity (by extension, the dynamic properties of relationships 
between any two or more ‘entities,’ ie, a ‘process’)—whether it is construed as an assemblage of 
particles, points in space-time, or a system of interacting particles or fields–is influenced by the properties 
of local space-time in which the particular entity or process exists or can potentially exist, and the 
properties of interactions between the entity or process and the local n-dimensional space-time in which it 
exists or can potentially exist. The ontological status of an entity or process (ie, the temporal extension of 
an entity or a relationship between any two or more entities) is thus premised on the ontological status of 
a ‘primitive’ space-time in which it is situated as well as the properties of relationships between the entity 
or process and other entities or processes in which the entity or process being evaluated is ‘enfolded’ 
forming a unique space-time manifold. My third premise is that reciprocal relationships exist between 
things or processes and space-time such that any entity or process is both characterized by properties of 
local space-time and, in reciprocal fashion, pre-figures or determines the properties of local space-time in 
which it is situated.  
 
Is a complete model of consciousness possible?  
Efforts to derive an complete model of consciousness capable of both accurately and adequately 
describing and explaining the broad range of characteristics, functions and subjective experiences 
associated with consciousness should ideally invite open-minded debate and inquiry from multiple 
perspectives including the formalisms of science, religion, spirituality and other epistemologies. The 
problem of reconciling disparate models of consciousness derived using diverse epistemologies is closely 
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related to the more general problem of trans-paradigm validation. Along these lines an important goal of  
interdisciplinary dialog on consciousness is to derive a general model that accommodates multi-level 
analysis of body-brain-environment examining the broad range of phenomena including quantum-
level events, biological processes related to ‘ordinary states,’ ‘pathological’ states (e.g., mental illness) 
and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states such as transpersonal experiences and claims of psychic 
functioning. A methodology that allows multi-level analysis may help elucidate important relationships 
between entities or processes in the body-brain-environment system including quantum processes, 
molecular mechanisms, single neurons, neuronal circuits, the whole brain, and interactions that take 
place at disparate levels in body-brain-environment that bear on consciousness. A complete model of 
consciousness should be able to rigorously characterize QM-level properties of body-brain-
environment and reconcile these properties with physical or neurophysiological properties of the 
system at the levels of single neurons, complex neural circuits and networks of circuits.  
The problem of adducing a complete explanatory model of consciousness that addresses the above 
criteria, and is congruent with current science, entails selecting a methodology for comparing disparate 
objective characteristics or subjective experiences of consciousness using language that is acceptable to 
and accessable by both science and alternative epistemologies. The method used in theory building will a 
priori bias the logical structure of any future model of consciousness that is adduced from first 
philosophical or scientific principles, constrain its propositions, and frame its relevance (or lack thereof) 
to the task of developing testable hypotheses for evaluating mechanisms underlying ‘ordinary,’ 
‘pathological,’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ conscious states or experiences. A complete model should 
ideally start from premises that are congruent with (at least some) premises of established scientific 
models of consciousness, as well as premises of general scientific models of space-time, matter, energy 
and information. This is true because the conceptual ‘ground’ of a complete model of consciousness is 
implicit in a model of cosmology which describes the nature of reality, places constraints on kinds of 
entities and processes that exist or can potentially exist, and delimits factors that may affect the evolution 
and functioning of complex living systems in which consciousness takes place or can potentially take 
place. Following the argument a broad conceptual ‘ground’ afforded by cosmology should provide the 
(explicit) framework in which any future systems model of consciousness is derived. 
Scientific models of consciousness are grounded in unexamined materialist assumptions  
Contemporary scientific models of consciousness reflect naïve reductionist assumptions about the nature 
of phenomena. For example, the assumption that conditions necessary and sufficient for consciousness 
can be empirically identified and correctly interpreted within the context of current science is equivalent 
to the belief that the nature of consciousness is reducible to classically described properties of matter and 
energy and contemporary models in neuroscience and psychology. Although many alternative 
explanatory models have been proposed, such ideas have had little or no influence on the direction of 
scientific inquiry. The result is that many theorists accept a priori what amount to naïve assumptions 
about the nature of phenomenal reality based on outdated or incomplete ideas in physics, neuroscience 
and psychology as constituting adequate explanatory models of consciousness. The philosophical biases 
that pre-figure current science suggest that naïve reductionist models may continue to be regarded as 
adequate explanations of consciousness barring a radical re-visioning of the core philosophical 
foundations of science. The reductionist framework imposed by current science on methods used to 
investigate consciousness presently excludes consideration of quantum-level processes or other postulated 
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non-classical phenomena because such phenomena are not verifiable using available technologies. Thus 
the current dogma limits contemporary scientific understandings of consciousness to naïve materialist 
assumptions while delaying progress toward models based on emerging research findings from physics 
and the life sciences that could potentially lead to novel understandings of mechanisms underlying both 
‘normal’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ characteristics, functions and subjective states of consciousness.  
Materialist theories of consciousness are at the foundations of Western philosophical and scientific 
thinking. Reductionist models of consciousness equate consciousness with brain function and include 
identity theories and functionalism. Reductionist theories are monist in that they posit the existence of 
only one kind of thing, namely fundamental kinds of physical entities. Contemporary reductionist models 
are, by definition, physicalist in that they reduce all observable characteristics and subjective states of 
consciousness to currently knowable physical and biological phenomena. Functionalism and identity 
theories are physicalist models that posit an equivalence between particular mental events and identifiable 
physical brain processes. According to reductionist physicalist models, words describing mental events 
are merely descriptions or “names” of processes, and there is no separate kind of corresponding mental 
“thing” that has existence independently of or ‘outside of’ the known physical world (Livaditis 2007). 
Authors cite evidence from psychological or neurophysiological research when arguing for different 
physicalist models of consciousness. Some evidence has been advanced in support of different versions of 
identity theory or functionalism however neither model has been strongly substantiated by research.  
 
Models of consciousness that do not rely on current science often rest on dualist theories that posit the 
existence of two fundamentally irreducible kinds of phenomena—the mental (or spiritual) and the 
physical—which interact in complex ways. Starting with Descartes non-physicalist dualist models are 
inherently at odds with scientific physicalist models and are generally dismissed by science as a priori 
invalid. Because of the scientific bias against assumptions of a non-physicalist dualist nature of 
consciousness such models are seldom subjected to rigorous scientific inquiry. A challenging issue that 
must be addressed in any dualist model of consciousness is agency which refers to problems inherent in 
explaining interactions between the two fundamentally different kinds of things posited by dualism, 
namely physical and non-physical phenomena and further, explaining how postulated interactions 
manifest as characteristics or qualia of consciousness. Contemporary scientific monist physicalist models 
of consciousness avoid the problem of agency by positing the existence of only physical brain processes 
and their correspondence to empirically verifiable mental states. Exhibit 1 describes core propositions, 
strengths and limitations of the major contemporary models of consciousness. 
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Exhibit 1: Contemporary mainstream theories of consciousness  
 
Theory Core propositions Strengths Limitations 
Type-type identity 
theory 
“Mind” is identical 
with brain 
(physicalism) 
therefore mental 
phenomena are 
physical phenomena, 
and all aspects of 
brain function are 
purely physical 
Each “type” of mental 
state is identical with 
a specific “type” of 
brain state 
The mind-body 
problem is eliminated 
as only physical states 
(body) are posited to 
exist 
Corresponds to 
Western psychiatric 
theories of mental 
illness and treatment 
resting on genetics 
and molecular biology 
which assume type-
type equivalence 
between brain states 
and mental 
phenomena  
Current functional 
brain imaging 
technologies are 
finding apparent 
correspondences 
between specific 
(‘ordinary’ and 
pathological) brain 
“states” and specific 
mental phenomena  
Requires verifiable 
correlations between 
specific mental states 
and specific brain 
states. This level of 
evidence is not 
possible using current 
research methods and 
contemporary 
technologies 
Accumulating 
research evidence 
(e.g., neural plasticity 
in post-stroke 
patients) supports 
view that mental 
states associated with 
discrete brain circuits  
intentionality cannot 
be explained using a 
purely physicalist 
account of 
consciousness 
 
Token-token identity 
theory 
Every token or 
particular instance of 
a given type of mental 
state is identical with 
a token or particular 
instance of a given 
type of physical brain 
state 
 
The mind-body 
problem is eliminated 
(as above) 
Neural plasticity in 
early development 
and post-CVA 
patients supports 
“multiple realized” 
mental states 
corresponding to 
Contemporary 
technologies  do not 
have capacity to 
demonstrate 
unvarying systematic 
equivalence between 
specific mental states 
and specific physical-
spatial brain locations 
or processes. 
Therefore token-token 
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many possible brain 
states 
Assumes that mental 
states are “multiply 
realized” thus repairs 
major weakness of 
type-type identity 
theory 
 
theories are inherently 
unverifiable 
Does not avoid 
problem of “dualism 
of properties” as 
mental states must 
have corresponding 
mental properties  
Not all brain states are 
identical with mental 
states (eg: autonomic 
functions), and 
therefore many brain 
states are likely 
unrelated to 
consciousness 
Metaphysical 
functionalism 
Mind or 
consciousness is a 
function in which 
specific mental states 
can be adequately 
specified in formal 
terms as inputs, 
outputs and relations 
to other mental states 
Avoids the problem of 
agency in dualism 
Avoids problem 
inherent in type-type 
identity theories of 
verifying 
correspondences 
between mental states 
and brain states  
Does not attempt to 
reconcile posited 
brain functions with 
known 
neurophysiological 
processes, and is 
therefore not 
empirical falsifiable  
Psycho-functionalism Materialist view that 
mental functions are 
contained in many 
possible kinds of 
processes in both 
complex living 
systems (eg 
neurophysiological 
functions) and 
machines (eg 
cybernetic devices).  
Computational 
functionalism is a 
specific type of 
psycho-functionalism 
Avoids problems of 
dualism 
Avoids apparent 
paradox of behavior 
“causality” in that 
behaviors consist of 
“being in” a specified 
mental state (eg: pain) 
Similar to token-token 
identity theory in that 
mental states may be 
multiply realized 
Mental states are not 
Does not account for 
intentionality or 
subjectivity of many 
mental states like 
beliefs, attitudes and 
desires (this is the 
problem of “absent 
qualia”) 
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which states that the 
mind is like a 
complex Turing 
machine in which 
functional elements 
are inter-related in 
complex hierarchical 
arrangements 
Mental states are 
reduced to complex 
input-output functions 
of physical structures 
or states 
The dynamic core 
hypothesis (Tononi 
1998) is a 
functionalist model 
which equates 
disparate conscious 
experiences with 
complex interactions 
among distributed 
groups of neurons 
restricted to human 
consciousness 
 
 
Why current science cannot provide a complete explanation of life and consciousness  
A widely held view in contemporary scientific discourse is that scientific method is capable of providing 
adequate explanations of all phenomena. This perspective, called “scientism,” rests on an unverifiable 
metaphysical assumption that all real phenomena are explainable in relationship to models and methods 
used in current science. This viewpoint amounts to metaphysical conjecture because it is a priori 
impossible to verify that all phenomena are explainable in the context of current scientific theories. 
Unstated scientistic assumptions essentially limit the role of science to confirming that proposed novel 
models are congruent with established contemporary models, which serves to reinforce unquestioned 
dogma and direct inquiry away from insights and research findings that challenge the dominant paradigm. 
Scientistic beliefs have resulted in the dismissal of calls for rigorous scientific investigation of phenomena 
that may be related to consciousness on the assumption that theories and methods outside of current 
science can not further elucidate the nature of consciousness.  
In addition to limitations of current scientific models of consciousness resulting from scientism posing as 
science, models of consciousness are limited by the unknowability of all possible phenomena. The 
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paradigm of current science does not—because it cannot—provide an adequate explanatory model of all 
possible complex non-living or living systems. This is true because what can be known about the set of 
propositions that describe all possible systems, including descriptions of conditions that are necessary and 
sufficient for the existence or potential existence of complex living systems, is by definition, unknowable 
and thus incomplete. It follows that current scientific models of life are necessarily incomplete because 
the set of all living systems constitutes an ‘open’ and ‘unknowable’ thus incompletely defined group of 
phenomena, i.e., the complete range of living systems that exist or may potentially exist throughout space-
time is and will always remain unknown because un-knowable.  
In models based on the assumption that consciousness is related to specialized functions of certain kinds 
of complex living systems, consciousness cannot be adequately explained by current science because 
complete explanations of all particular observable characteristics, functions or subjective states of 
consciousness cannot be achieved through induction. This is true because inductive analysis of the 
properties of a series of specific instantiations of systems that exhibit or have the capacity to exhibit 
consciousness cannot conceivably determine the complete set of factors that constitute necessary and 
sufficient conditions for all characteristics, functions or subjective states of consciousness because 
(above) the set of all possible systems that have or potentially have the capacity to exhibit or experience 
consciousness is unknowable. Therefore, at best, any model of consciousness can describe observable 
characteristics of particular functions of consciousness (e.g., vision, hearing, etc) or descriptions of ‘what 
it is like’ for humans to experience such and such a ‘state’ of consciousness. By the same token it is not 
possible to adduce a complete general model of consciousness that explains or is capable of explaining all 
possible conscious characteristics, functions, ‘states’ or ‘experiences’ because it is not metaphysically 
conceivable to establish through observation, introspection or induction a complete series of all particular 
instantiations of conscious ‘states’ or ‘qualia’ that exist or may potentially exist.  
Three assumptions limit the capacity of current science to accurately characterize consciousness and to 
derive a complete model, namely one capable of explaining all observable characteristics and subjective 
states of consciousness. These limiting assumptions are often implicit in the scientific discourse on 
consciousness:  
 Phenomena that affect complex systems are observable (and thus knowable) using current 
scientific methods and technologies, and can therefore be empirically verified 
 Systems in general and complex living systems such as body-brain behave in predictable linear 
ways described by classical physics and chemistry.  
 Complex living systems exist and operate in 4-dimensional space-time and their properties can be 
completely described by Newtonian physics.  
Assumptions of “linearity” and predictability in complex biological systems are naïve and do not take into 
consideration recent research findings on both ‘ordinary,’ pathological and ‘non-ordinary’ aspects of 
conscious experience.  While some properties of complex living systems can be characterized in terms of 
discrete processes from classical physics and chemistry, even the simplest life forms cannot be completely 
characterized without invoking non-linear dynamics. The assumption that linear cause-effect relationships 
exist between particular conscious states or experiences and discrete biological processes is not only 
unverifiable using current research methods and technologies but cannot even potentially explain complex 
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relationships that characterize consciousness in living systems.  Simplistic reductionist assumptions about 
the nature of life itself and, by extension, consciousness are carry-overs from classical Newtonian physics 
that cannot potentially explain the dynamics of body-brain.  
In view of the intrinsic limitations of the explanatory power of contemporary scientific models of 
consciousness it is nevertheless possible to adduce more ‘limited’ models that may adequately 
characterize the properties of select characteristics, functions or subjective states of consciousness in 
relationship to factors or processes that comprise the boundary conditions of systems that exhibit 
particular characteristics of consciousness in some cases. With this caveat in mind it is germane to remark 
that particular instantiations of certain objective characteristics or subjective states may not be reducible 
to a definable set of postulated ‘elemental’ or ‘core’ characteristics or functions of consciousness at a 
biological, physical, energetic or informational level, nor can current science identify or verify all 
possible constraints or limiting conditions associated with all ‘discrete’ observable characteristics or 
reports of subjective states of consciousness. Achieving a complete general systems model capable of 
explaining the range of observable characteristics and subjective states associated with consciousness will 
require nothing less than a radical re-visioning of science and established scientific theories at the level of 
their core premises and research methodologies. 
 
Assumptions about causality in consciousness are paradigm-dependent  
Theories of reality rest on disparate epistemological and metaphysical assumptions which, in turn, 
translate into different understandings of causality. Current science assumes that biological processes in 
general and the special case of consciousness in complex living systems can be adequately described in 
the terms of physical and biological processes linked by discrete linear relationships. Along the same 
lines current science asserts that ‘reality’ consists of categories of phenomena that are observable, 
susceptible to empirical investigation using existing research methodologies and technologies, and 
therefore knowable within the conceptual framework of science. According to this perspective, 
established ideas from the ‘basic sciences’ including physics, chemistry and biology, would be expected 
to eventually explain all causal mechanisms that exist or can potentially exist in nature. If this is the case 
there is no need to invoke non-classical models or radically different   pathways  of causality to explain 
any phenomena or the relationships between them. Contemporary scientific models of consciousness rest 
on similar naïve assumptions of classical linear causality. However, many alternative models of 
consciousness do not assume linear causality - including, for example, models based on complexity 
theory or quantum mechanics.  Models of consciousness based on quantum mechanics or other non-
classical paradigms are premised on non-local or a-causal relationships between phenomena (Vannini 
2008). For example, quantum mechanics posits that photons or other sub-atomic particles can exist as 
entangled states related in exact and predictable ways, but that characteristics of entangled sub-atomic 
particles—or phenomena related to them—cannot be formally described using simple deterministic 
models of causality. Therefore, although entanglement between photons has been experimentally verified, 
classical Newtonian concepts of space, time and causality cannot adequately explain or predict properties 
of sub-atomic particles. Considerable debate is taking place over the relevance of quantum mechanics to 
models of consciousness (Baars & Edelman 2012). From the point of view of quantum mechanics all that 
can be claimed is that two particles that are separated in space sometimes remain probabilistically 
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correlated or ‘entangled’ over vast distances. The same dilemma that constrains the explanatory power of 
current science with respect to the role of quantum-level events in consciousness may hinder on-going 
research efforts to elucidate mechanisms associated with claims of ‘energy’ healing, telepathy, 
clairvoyance, psychokinesis and other so-called ‘non-ordinary’ phenomena associated with human 
consciousness. For example above-chance correspondences have been reported between certain states of 
consciousness including sustained ‘intention’ or attention, prayer, or meditation, and intended physical 
effects in living systems - however to date scientific investigations have failed to elucidate a mechanism 
for such   events.  Along these lines, it is not clear whether energetic changes at the level of sub-atomic 
particles or energy fields when entanglement is confirmed to take place are related to biological processes 
associated with the effects of human intention on living systems. In spite of the absence of a testable 
model of quantum level events in consciousness, reports of beneficial outcomes following  ‘healing 
intention’ and above-chance changes in both non-living and living systems following ‘directed intention’ 
may provide useful concepts for investigating phenomena associated with human consciousness (Jonas 
2003)  
Current science subscribes to materialism, the philosophical perspective that so-called ‘ordinary’ states of 
consciousness including perception, cognition and emotions are reducible to knowable and verifiable 
physiological processes at the level of neurotransmitters and brain circuits. According to the conventional 
model both pathological states such as neurological or psychiatric disorders, and ‘non-ordinary’ states 
such as transpersonal experiences and claims of psychic functioning are caused by dysregulations of 
‘normal’ physiological processes that underlie ‘ordinary’ functions or states of consciousness. Proponents 
of the orthodox view argue that an adequate explanatory model of  ‘ordinary,’ pathological and so-called 
‘non-ordinary’ functions and experiences associated with consciousness will emerge from on-going 
advances in the current scientific paradigm without the need to introduce or invent new ways of ‘thinking 
about’ the phenomenal world in general or the special case of consciousness. This is essentially the 
perspective of functionalism, the current dominant scientific model of consciousness. Functionalism 
assumes that particular characteristics or subjective experiences are manifestations of corresponding 
functional states at the level of neurotransmitters or neural circuits. An (often) implicit assumption of 
functionalism is that physiological processes that underlie and correspond to particular functions or 
subjective states of consciousness can be adequately characterized in the context of current science using 
available research methods and technologies, permitting valid inferences about the nature of 
consciousness.  
Biological, energetic and informational processes that shape living systems function in both discrete 
linear ways and complex non-linear ways. Simple discrete linear processes and complex non-linear 
processes are linked to one another in dynamic web-like hierarchies that change in relationship to both 
internal and external factors. Along these lines body-brain can be viewed as a dynamic system that exists 
as a hierarchy of interdependent biological, informational and energetic processes in space-time. Models 
of consciousness must take into account the nature of complex living systems in which consciousness 
takes place or can potentially take place (Tononi 1998). Most models start from the premise that body-
brain exists as a dynamic system that functions in relationship to complex living systems and their 
environments. Disparate “levels” of structure-function in body-brain may be causally related to different 
categories of ‘ordinary,’ pathological or ‘non-ordinary’ conscious experience. According to the model 
experiences interpreted as ‘pathological’ or ‘non-ordinary’ states may reflect particular states or 
transitions in a dynamic hierarchy of inter-related biological, energetic and informational processes that 
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comprise body-brain. Particular processes and kinds of underlying biological, energetic or informational 
processes that characterize them may be reflected in the relative severity or ‘intensity’ of subjective 
experiences of so-called ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and ‘non-ordinary’ conscious experiences. 
Models that do not make the assumption that consciousness can be accurately or completely characterized 
in terms of discrete causal relationships in living systems invoke non-deterministic ideas about the nature 
of causality, including Jungian synchronicity, quantum field theory, morphogenetic field theory, PSI 
models, and others, to explain objective properties or subjective states of consciousness. The debate over 
determinism (i.e., the role of causality versus a-causality) in nature in general, and consciousness in 
particular, is fundamentally important to practical methodological problems involved in consciousness 
research, because disparate perspectives on causality translate into divergent methodologies for 
investigating postulated  ‘causes’ of particular functional attributes or subjective experiences with respect 
to body-brain-environment. The debate over causality is reflected in the debate over research designs used 
to investigate the claims of disparate models of consciousness.  
The nature of “body-brain” and its relationship to consciousness  
The nature of “body-brain” in space-time is related to the nature of “embodiment” of structures or 
processes that comprise body-brain, and by extension the nature of interactions between embodied 
structures and processes and phenomena that exist “outside of” body-brain. Understanding the 
phenomenological nature of “body-brain” entails analysis of how body-brain is situated in space-time, 
which is limited by the capacity of science to accurately and completely characterize body-brain using 
contemporary research methodologies and technologies. Disparate models of reality are based on 
different premises about the nature of “body-brain” and space-time therefore addressing problems related 
to the nature of “body-brain” in space-time requires examining metaphysical and epistemological 
problems pertaining to verifying existence and characterizing properties of phenomena that disparate 
models posit. Different metaphysical starting points and epistemological perspectives embedded in 
disparate models of reality a priori bias and place constraints on models of “body-brain” construed as 
legitimate within a particular model of reality. Analysis of the nature of “self,” “mind,” and 
“consciousness” is related to the more general problem of understanding the nature of “body-brain” but 
also takes into account questions pertaining to identity and functional attributes of these terms. 
Philosophical and methodological issues pertaining to problems of “body-brain-environment” and 
“embodiment” are closely related to practical problems in designing research methodologies that 
determine how phenomena are investigated, and shape inferences about the nature of consciousness. In 
other words, the core premises of any particular model of consciousness determine methodological 
approaches that are regarded as legitimate for characterizing the nature of consciousness with respect to 
“body-brain-environment.” 
Novel models of life in general including the special case of living systems capable of exhibiting 
consciousness take into account research findings in many domains of knowledge including complex 
systems theory, quantum mechanics, and other emerging perspectives that depart from current science. 
Recent advances in quantum biology are yielding important insights into the role of QM-level processes 
in the animal and plant kingdoms in general (Bunting 2013). However, most of this work remains highly 
theoretical and the majority of scientific studies on consciousness investigate postulated mechanisms of 
action that are strictly biological in nature. The assumption that only empirically verifiable phenomena 
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influence non-living or living systems is a widely shared belief based on an underlying pre-scientific 
metaphysical assumption about the ‘kind of thing’ consciousness is, which has not only not been 
empirically verified but which may not be verifiable in the context of current scientific thinking. This 
metaphysical assumption has led to the dogma that legitimate models of body-brain must be grounded in 
already established biological mechanisms. In contrast to the orthodox view, some recently proposed 
models posit that “ordinary,” “pathological (i.e., as in mental illness)” and “non-ordinary (e.g., 
transpersonal experiences and Psi)” functions or subjective states of consciousness are manifestations of 
complex structure-function relationships between the body-brain-environment system and incompletely 
characterized forms of “energy” or information. Emerging research findings suggest that a ‘subtle’ 
domain or “field” may comprise the ground in which the body-brain exists and functions outside of 
constraints widely held to be fundamental boundary conditions as described in classical Newtonian space-
time.  
Models that purport to explain how “body-brain” is situated in space-time are based on metaphysical 
assumptions about the nature of reality and “ways of knowing” (i.e., epistemologies) that are either 
implicit or explicit in disparate models of consciousness. Therefore assumptions about the nature of 
reality and agreement on valid ways of knowing about reality translate into schemata for identifying and 
characterizing attributes of body-brain that exist or can potentially exist. Important questions when 
approaching the problem of how “body-brain” is situated in space-time include:  
 What primary entities or processes (if any) constitute “body-brain?” (i.e., what primary 
phenomena constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of ‘body-brain?’) 
 What primary external phenomena ‘interact’ or ‘interface’ with body-brain comprising the body-
brain-environment ‘system’ (i.e., the system in which body-brain is situated in space-time)? 
Stated differently, what constitutes the ‘environment’ in which body-brain is situated? Further, 
what research methods and technologies can most accurately and completely characterize the 
nature of the brain-body-environment system? 
 Can inferences be made about specific properties of the body-brain-environment system that may 
help clarify necessary or sufficient conditions for consciousness, or necessary and sufficient 
boundary conditions in which consciousness can potentially take place in relationship to systems 
situated in space-time? Stated differently, in view of what is known about the nature of the 
physical universe and how body-brain is situated in space-time, is it possible to make inferences 
about properties of the body-brain-environment system using current science? Further, can this 
general approach be expected to lead to a more complete model of consciousness? 
 Can current scientific models of consciousness yield falsifiable claims about the nature of the 
body-brain-environment system in which consciousness exists or can potentially exist? If so, what 
kinds of testable claims can be made? If not, what changes in current models would be expected 
to yield falsifiable hypotheses about the nature of consciousness?  
 Can claims of correspondences between particular characteristics of body-brain-environment and 
particular observable characteristics or subjective states of consciousness be empirically verified 
using available research methodologies and technologies? 
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 In view of what is known or knowable (ie according to current science) about relationships 
between body-brain-environment and consciousness, are certain research methodologies more 
likely to yield accurate or more complete descriptions of particular objective characteristics or 
subjective states of consciousness? Along these lines, can current research methodologies be 
optimized to more adequately address problems related to consciousness? 
 
The above general discussion bears on the problem of characterizing conscious experiences interpreted as 
‘non-ordinary’ states including claims of Psi. Exhibit 2 lists models of “body-brain” that have been put 
forward in contemporary scientific dialog on consciousness including the author’s proposed model that 
incorporates assumptions of current science together with assumptions from emerging paradigms in 
physics. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Different models of “body-brain” imply different properties of consciousness 
Issues in 
consciousness 
research 
Current Science Author’s proposed model 
The nature of 
‘body-brain’ 
 ‘Body-brain’ is comprised of 
molecules, cells and tissues 
 ‘Body-brain’ can be accurately and 
completely described in terms of 
anatomy, physiology and interactions 
with the environment 
Structures and processes that 
characterize complex living systems 
exist in 4-dimensional space-time, are 
observable and empirically verifiable, 
and can be accurately and completely 
described in terms of linear dynamics 
‘Body-brain’ cannot be adequately 
described using current science and can be 
more accurately and completely 
characterized as a dynamic pattern of 
interacting matter, energy and information  
Functional characteristics of ‘body-brain’ 
are influenced by complex interactions 
between molecules, cells and tissues at 
multiple levels in a complex web-like 
hierarchy 
Both linear and non-linear interactions take 
place within  ‘body-brain’ and between 
‘body-brain’ and ‘environment’ 
Interactions between ‘body-brain’ and 
environment take place in 4-dimensional 
space-time, and in some cases possibly also 
in higher order n-dimensional space-times 
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 ‘Ordinary’ 
states of 
consciousness 
Structures and  processes in living 
systems can be adequately described in 
terms of linear dynamics using 
conventional scientific models 
 ‘Ordinary’ states of consciousness can 
be accurately and completely described 
in terms of established scientific 
models and investigated using 
contemporary empirical methods 
There is no real distinction between 
“structure” and “process” in living systems. 
These terms reflect  different semantic  
‘frames’ for describing complex inter-
relationships at different hierarchic  
‘locations’ in ‘body-brain’  
 ‘Ordinary’ states of consciousness cannot 
be accurately or completely described using 
established scientific models and methods 
because they ultimately rest on poorly 
understood non-linear phenomena that are 
not susceptible to available research 
methods 
Pathological 
states of 
consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pathological states of consciousness 
(eg mental illness) can be accurately 
and completely described using 
already established scientific models 
describing brain function  
 
More complete understandings of 
pathological ‘states’ of consciousness can be 
achieved using non-linear dynamics than 
linear dynamics of discrete states  
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Non-ordinary’ 
states 
‘Non-ordinary’ states of consciousness 
including transpersonal experiences 
and claims of psychic functioning can 
be explained using established models 
in neuroscience, psychology and 
anthropology 
Certain ‘non-ordinary’ states of 
consciousness including verified cases of Psi 
cannot be explained by current science and 
may be consistent with the predictions of 
quantum mechanics or other non-classical 
models in physics  
 
Journal of Nonlocality  Vol III  Nr 1, June 2014                                                                                                   ISSN: 2167-6283 
 
20 
 
 
Toward a model of Psi—review of evidence, framing the problem and questions  
Evidence supporting claims of psychic functioning comes from many research domains. Several 
controlled studies show that prayer and other forms of directed intention influence biological systems on 
the scale of cellular activity and physiology (Radin 2004; Jonas 2003; Astin 2000). The first scientific 
report of an apparent non-local connection between sensory isolated individuals was published in 1965 
(Duane 1965). EEG recordings of identical twins in separate rooms showed that when a light was flashed 
in the eyes of one twin, increased alpha activity occurred in the brain of the other twin. This effect, 
described as “extrasensory induction,” was replicated many years afterwards by several small open trials 
on empathically linked individuals. Visually evoked potentials (VEP) in one individual were correlated 
with above-chance brain activation in the other individual sitting inside an electromagnetically shielded 
room (Grinberg-Zylberbaum 1987; 1994). These early findings were subsequently confirmed by a 
controlled study involving 60 pairs of individuals (Standish, et al. 2001). Other studies suggest apparent 
non-local effects of intention or prayer on the basis of above-chance correlations in electro-dermal 
activity between sensory-isolated subjects (Schlitz 1997). Considerable controversy surrounded the 
publication of findings of a small controlled study suggesting that visual evoked potentials in one 
individual correlate with above-chance activation on fMRI in the visual association cortex of an 
empathically linked person who is physically and electromagnetically isolated (Standish, et al. 2003). 
This finding has been replicated in a case study using a similar VEP paradigm and conventional EEG 
recording methods (Wackermann 2003).Findings of a small non-blinded pilot study suggest that healing 
intention in one individual corresponds to consistent changes in activity on fMRI in brain regions 
involved with attention in an individual who is empathically “linked” however these findings have not 
been replicated in subsequent pilot studies or large controlled trials (Achterberg 2005).  
Evidence of ‘non-local’ perception may reflect a special kind of quantum entanglement and be consistent 
with predictions of how QM-level phenomena operate in complex living systems (Tressoldi 2011). An 
apparent case of macroscopic quantum entanglement has been reported between cultured nerve cells that 
are electromagnetically isolated (Pizzi 2004). Independent replication of this finding may offer important 
clues of the involvement of quantum non-locality or other postulated non-classical mechanisms associated 
with prayer and other forms of healing intention (DHI).  
Both current science and emerging non-classical paradigms have been invoked in efforts to explain 
apparent relationships between prayer and other forms of distant healing intention and changes in brain 
function measured using EEG or fMRI. Extremely low-frequency electromagnetic waves may explain 
some observed cases of apparent information transfer between two or more isolated individuals even 
when EMF shielding is used (Miller 2013; Sidorov 2012). Reports of apparent correlations between 
changes in brain activity and prayer or other forms of directed intention may be consistent with 
macroscopic quantum entanglement effects postulated by Thaheld (Thaheld 2000; 2005). It has been 
suggested that healing intention is an essential factor in both biomedicine and non-Western healing 
traditions (Zahourek 2004). 
As is true when approaching the problem of consciousness in general, deriving an explanatory model of 
so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states of consciousness including claims of psychic functioning can be 
approached from disparate world-views or epistemologies. From the perspectives of cognitive psychology 
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and neuroscience models purporting to explain Psi are often described as corollaries to established 
neurobiological models of sensation, perception and attention. Models that postulate necessary and 
sufficient neurobiological or psychological causes, conditions or processes underlying Psi are sometimes 
offered as extensions of mainstream cognitive neuropsychological models pertaining to how raw sensory 
data are ‘filtered’ using implicit (unconscious) or explicit (conscious) cognitive routines. For example the 
concept of “non-conscious perception” (ie “subliminal perception”) is conventionally understood as a 
process by which an organism is ‘aware’ of environmental stimuli that are below the ‘normal’ sensory 
threshold. According to this model the organism can perceive in the absence of ‘awareness’ ie, a percept 
is formed in response to a stimulus however the organism is not conscious of the percept.   Other models 
posit a capacity for awareness of ‘subtle’ stimuli that are not perceived, in other words there is awareness 
in the absence of perception. Cognitive psychology models hold that ‘normal sensory functioning’ 
subsumes non-conscious, “sub-liminal” or “sub-threshold” perception in addition to so-called ‘ordinary’ 
perception. However conventional scientific models rely on established theories in psychology and 
neuroscience to explain the range of perceptual states and do not invoke “subtle” energy or poorly 
described neural mechanisms to explain claims of so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states.  
In contrast to contemporary scientific models of perception Psi models postulate the existence of novel 
kinds of energy or information that are generally excluded or a priori dismissed in contemporary 
scientific dialog, as well as neural functions that permit perception and accurate interpretation of subtle 
environmental signals. Important questions that must be addressed in any future model of consciousness 
that attempts to reconcile explanations of ‘ordinary’ perception with co-called ‘non-ordinary’ states 
including claims of Psi include:  
 Are disparate neural structures and processes involved in ‘ordinary’ vs ‘non-ordinary’ 
perception?  
 Are ‘ordinary’ vs ‘non-ordinary’ conscious states associated with different energetic or 
informational mechanisms? If it turns out that ‘non-ordinary’ states involve fundamentally 
different mechanisms can existing research methods and technologies be employed to investigate 
them? If it turns out that ‘ordinary’ and ‘non-ordinary’ states involve similar mechanisms, what 
neural or other mechanisms play a role when classically described forms of energy or information 
are associated with ‘non-ordinary’ states of consciousness including claims of psychic 
functioning?  
 Is energy or information at the level of simple QM events or quantum fields related to Psi in non-
trivial ways that can be investigated using contemporary research methodologies and 
technologies? In other words, are quantum-level events including sub-atomic particles or their 
fields centrally and critically involved in mechanisms underlying so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states 
of consciousness including claims of psychic functioning? Further, are models that postulate 
quantum-level energetic or informational processes in human brain functioning and—by 
extension perception—falsifiable using contemporary scientific research methods and 
technologies? If so what methods or technologies would more likely yield findings? If not, what 
advances in existing research methods or technologies may permit scientific investigation of the 
role of postulated QM phenomena in consciousness?  
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Closing remarks 
In spite of rapid advances in neuroscience basic questions about consciousness remain unanswered. There 
is still no consensus on how to define consciousness, what a model of consciousness should encompass, 
or optimal research strategies for investigating different aspects of consciousness (Boly et al 2013). 
Research progress will accelerate and important advances in understanding will take place when science 
becomes open to asking questions about so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states of consciousness including 
transpersonal experiences and claims of psychic functioning.  Philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
consciousness is not merely an academic pursuit but the work of collective imagination, self-reflection 
and reasoning that theorists and researchers must engage in to tackle the complex problems associated 
with consciousness, because philosophical inquiry will clarify important unanswered questions and 
suggest novel research methods designed to address those questions. Future models of consciousness will 
not rely exclusively on empirical verification of strictly biological processes and will take into account 
both classically described biological processes (eg, neurophysiological and immunological functioning) 
and non-classical physical phenomena, including the postulated role of macroscopic coherent quantum 
fields and quantum non-locality (Vannini 2008). Beginning from this more inclusive conceptual 
framework future research programs will explore the range of biological and physical phenomena 
yielding novel insights into ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological’ and ‘non-ordinary’ functions and states of 
consciousness.   
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